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Introduction
Asbestosis victims file approximately 300 to 400 claims each
month.1 An estimated 12,000 to 20,000 pending asbestosis cases re-
present the largest category of claims in the area of products liability
litigation.2 Reports of this disease surfaced in the United States as
early as the 1930's,3 yet a variety of industries still utilize products
containing asbestos fibers.4 Florida courts have numerous asbestosis
cases on their dockets, and it has been predicted that the profusion of
these claims will continue for several years. Dr. Irving Selikoff, director
of Mt. Sinai Hospital Environment Sciences Laboratory in New York,
claims tens of thousands of cancer victims have not yet realized the
association of their malignancies with asbestos exposure. 5 Conse-
quently, current litigation represents a mere fraction of potential suits.
Compounding the problem are the recent decisions in White v.
Johns-Manville' and Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America7
which could dramatically increase the already overwhelming number of
asbestos related lawsuits.8 In White, the Fourth Circuit held shipyard
workers suffering from diseases caused by asbestos inhalation could
bring claims under admiralty jurisdiction which the state statute of
limitations would have otherwise barred.9 The court in Keene expanded
1. The Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
2. Id. at 24, col. 1; Am. Bus., Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 3.
3. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
4. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
5. Am. Bus., Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 4.
6. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981).
7. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 1644
(1982).
8. The Nat'l L.J., supra note 1.
9. 662 F.2d 234.
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the liability of insurance companies, holding that the statutes of limita-
tions in asbestos cases began to run either at the time of exposure, or
the earliest manifestation of symptoms of the disease, whichever is
later. 10 Further, at least one court has suggested the application of
"market-share liability" to asbestos suits.11
Each of these decisions lays the foundation for an onslaught of
new asbestos litigation. This comment explores the basis for each deci-
sion, and examines its potential effects on future asbestos related law-
suits. An overview of the difficulties inherent in asbestos litigation is
also provided.
Perspective on Asbestos
The term asbestos encompasses a diverse group of natural miner-
als capable of separating into fibers.12 There are primarily six species of
these minerals, each having distinct characteristics.13 Durable and flex-
ible, resistant to fire and wear, asbestos is ideal for use in over 3,000
industrial products and functions.14 Workers who manufacture insula-
tion, clutch linings in cars, brake shoes, walls, tiles, floors, ironing
boards and various resistant cloths frequently suffer exposure to
asbestos.' 5
Unfortunately, exposure to asbestos fibers leads to a number of
serious, often fatal illnesses. The most common of these, asbestosis, is a
chronic fibrotic reaction in pulmonary tissue which results in severe
breathing problems.' The disease usually manifests itself between ten
and twenty-five years after initial exposure, 17 and occasionally has a
10. 667 F.2d at 1041.
11. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1353.
12. R. SAWYER,. ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIALS IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS: A
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT Part 2, 1-1-1 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1-1-2 (citing F. D. KOVER, ASBESTOS: A REVIEW OF SELECTED LITER-
ATURE THROUGH 1973 RELATING TO ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE AND HEALTH EF-
FECTS (EPA-560/2]-76-001, Office of Toxic Substances 1976)).
15. P. BEESON & W. MCDERMOTT, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 914 (13th ed.
1971).
16. Id. at 915.
17. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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latency period of up to forty years."8 Once inhaled, asbestos fibers re-
main in the lungs causing progressive, irreversible damage. 9 As a re-
sult of the long latency period, physicians cannot determine with rea-
sonable accuracy which of the victim's exposures to the fibers caused
the onset of illness.20 This feature of the disease led to the controversy
regarding commencement of insurance liability in Keene.2'
Asbestos inhalation may also result in such malignant diseases as
lung cancer, pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma, and cancer of the
gastrointestinal organs.2 2 It has been estimated that at least fifty per-
cent of workers afflicted with asbestosis develop lung cancer.2 3 Family
members in contact with those directly exposed to asbestos fibers may
also develop pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma.24 The problem has
become so widespread that a number of United States Senate and
House members have proposed "White Lung Bills" which would estab-
lish minimum standards for state workers' compensation laws by pro-
viding "prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation for
occupational diseases or death resulting from exposure to asbestos. ' 25
Insurance Company Liability in Asbestosis Cases
In all insurance litigation, the plaintiff must prove that an injury
or accident "occurred" within the meaning of a liability policy.26 While
most insurance contracts provide coverage for injuries within the policy
period,27 carriers often contest coverage in situations involving latent
18. 7 F. NETTER, THE CIBA COLLECTION OF MEDICAL ILLUSTRATIONS: RESPIRA-
TORY DISEASES 211 (1979).
19. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083.
20. Id.
21. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
22. Motley & Middleton, Asbestos Disease Among Railroad Workers, 17 TRIAL
38, 39-40 (1981). Mesothelioma is defined as "a malignant tumor derived from meso-
thelial tissue" (peritoneum, pleura and pericardium). DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 803 (26th ed. 1981).
23. Id. at 40 (citing Lewinsohn, Health Hazards of Asbestos: A Review of Re-
cent Trends, 24 J. Soc. OccuP. MED. 2 (1974)).
24. F. NETER, supra note 18, at 211.
25. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
26. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1386 (1956).
27. Id. at 1387. The policy issued to Keene by Hartford Accident and Idemnity
Company states:
3
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disease, claiming the injury occurred beyond the time limits of the
policy. 8
Advocates of the manifestation theory contend injury occurs when
symptoms of asbestosis are revealed.2" Under this approach bodily in-
jury is deemed to occur when the disease becomes apparent or when
the victim knew, or should have known, of his illness.30 Therefore, only
those insurance companies who covered the manufacturer during the
period of manifestation of the symptoms are liable for damages to the
victim.
In Porter v. American Optical Corp.,"1 the district court utilized
the manifestation theory. A victim of asbestosis sued the company
which manufactured a respirator he had used as protection against in-
halation of asbestos fibers and dust.32 The trial court held that determi-
nation of the onset of injury was based upon manifestation of the symp-
toms of asbestosis.33 The insurer providing coverage when the plaintiff's
injury became apparent was held responsible, whereas the insurers of-
fering coverage during the victim's exposure, and during the period
when the formal medical diagnosis was made, were exonerated.34 The
[t]he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury ... to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and
the company shall have th the right and duty to defend any suit against
the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury ... even if
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent ....
Keene, 667 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis original).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
29. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216 (6th Cir. 1980).
30. Id.
31. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981). This case is distinguishable from others cited,
since the filter manufacturer, rather than the asbestos manufacturer, is the party in-
sured. However the court stated that since the respirators were specifically used to
protect against the hazards of exposure to asbestos, the controlling principles in cases
against asbestos manufacturers should be utilized. Id. at 1144.
32. Id. at 1130-31.
33. Id. at 1131.
34. Id. The district court decision resulted in the two appeals presented. Ameri-
can Optical Corp., the manufacturer of the respirators appealed its liability, and Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Company appealed the decision holding it the sole insurer
liable for coverage. Id.
1576 Nova Law Journal
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter expressly rejected the mani-
festation theory. 35 The majority held an insurance company's liability
for bodily injury due to a cumulative disease should be apportioned
among all insurers covering the manufacturer during the "injurious ex-
posure" period.36 This reversal closely followed a decision by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc.37 The Forty-Eight Insulations Court described
asbestosis as, "a series of continuing injuries to the body, [or a] contin-
uing tort,"' 38 so that companies providing insurance coverage through-
out the period of exposure had to contribute to the victim's compensa-
tion. Five insurance companies had issued policies over the twenty year
period involved, and for some years, Forty-Eight Insulations had been
self insured.39 The court held liability for damages and defense costs
were to be pro-rated among all the companies involved, and treated
Forty-Eight Insulations as a self-insurer for the period during which it
had no commercial coverage.40 When the same court was required to
apply Ohio law in another asbestos suit,41 it determined that a cause of
action for asbestos-related disease accrued when symptoms were mani-
fested.42 This decision was in direct opposition to Forty-Eight
Insulations.
A bold departure from these approaches occurred in Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of North America.4 3 From 1948 to 1972, plaintiff
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1145. The case was remanded for apportionment of coverage between
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,
and the judgment against American Optical was affirmed. The district court judgment
absolving Continental Insurance Company of liability was also affirmed since Continen-
tal provided no coverage during Porter's exposure to asbestos fibers and his use of the
respirator. Id. at 1145-46.
37. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 1217.
39. Id. at 1213, 1215.
40. Id. at 1225. The five companies included: Insurance Company of North
America, Affiliated FM Insurance Company, Illinois National Insurance Company,
Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Id. at 1215.
41. Clutter v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 1158.
43. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5771
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Keene Corporation manufactured thermal insulation products contain-
ing asbestos."" As a result of its employees' exposure to this compound,
Keene had been involved as a co-defender in over six thousand cases by
alleged victims of asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer.45
Throughout the period of the er'ployees' exposure, Keene was suc-
cessively issued comprehensive general liability policies by a number of
insurance companies. During litigation however, each insurer denied
coverage in whole or in part.46 Keene filed suit for a declaratory judg-
ment and damages in order to determine the liability of each insurer
with which it had contracted.47
The court rejected both the manifestation theory and the exposure
theory proposed by the insurers, and held "inhalation exposure, expo-
sure in residence, and manifestation all trigger coverage under the poli-
cies."' 48 The court's theory regarding time of injury was essentially a
combination of theories previously accepted, and provided that each in-
surer be held liable for the entire loss. 49 "When more than one policy
applies to a loss, the 'other insurance' provisions of each policy provide
a scheme by which the insurers' liability is to be apportioned. ' 5° The
manufacturer was released from liability for any damage which may
have occurred during its uninsured periods. 51 The court attempted to
44. Id. at 1038.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1039. Keene was covered by the following companies: From Dec. 1961-
Aug. 1968, Insurance Company of North America (INA); from Aug. 1967-Aug. 1968,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; from Aug. 1968-Aug. 1971, Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co.; from Aug. 1971-Oct. 1974, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.; and Oct. 1974-
Oct. 1980, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Id. at 1038.
47. Id. at 1039.
48. Id. at 1047. Additionally, the court defined bodily injury as any segment of
injury encompassed by asbestosis. Id.
49. Id. at 1041, 1050. This liability includes defense costs as well as indemnifica-
tion. Id. 1041.
50. Id. at 1050.
51. Id. at 1048-49. The insurance companies asserted that this decision would
allow the defendant to purchase coverage for only one year, and still be covered for a
long period of time. The court presented two reasons why this would not be the case: 1)
the longer a company has purchased insurance, the fewer number of injuries it would
be responsible for; and 2) since only one policy would apply to each injury, the insured
would only be able to collect damages from one of the several policies it purchased,
thereby benefitting the insurance companies. Id.
6
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satisfy the expectations of the manufacturer when it purchased the in-
surance policies, and to "give effect to the policies' dominant purpose of
indemnity."'5 2
The contracting parties for an insurance policy exchange assump-
tion of the risk of the insured's liability, for a fixed amount of money.53
An insurance contract represents an exchange of an uncertain loss
for a certain loss. In a comprehensive general liability insurance
policy, the uncertain loss is the possibility of incurring legal liabil-
ity, and the certain loss is the premium payment ..... At the
heart of the transaction is the insured's purchase of certainty-a
valuable commodity."
The manifestation theory defeats this purpose, since manufacturers
have been virtually uninsured after the onslaught of asbestos suits filed
in recent years.55 Insurance companies providing coverage during the
exposure period, but prior to manifestation of symptoms, escape liabil-
ity under this approach. Consequently manufacturers face the strong
possibility of being forced out of business from damage awards against
which they are not indemnified, depriving them of the freedom from
liability for which they bargained.
The exposure theory is equally threatening, also defeating the pur-
pose of the bargained-for contract.58 Under this approach no guarantee
of protection against future development of the disease exists. The
court held that in purchasing insurance coverage, Keene Corporation
bargained for coverage of all future liability excluding only those inju-
ries it knew or should have known existed prior to the insurance agree-
ment. 57 The court also determined the extent of protection provided
during the policy period. The majority once again focused on the prom-
52. Id. at 1041.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1045. Once it was confirmed that exposure to asbestos causes serious
disease, (late 1960's-1970's), insurance companies stopped issuing policies providing
adequate coverage for those injuries. Id.
56. Id. at 1044. Under Hartford's theory, the original exposure to asbestos fibers
constitutes the injury, and future development of the disease is merely "a consequence
of the injury." Id.
57. Id. at 1048.
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ise of certaint) upon which plaintiff had relied.8
The court's interpretation of the contracts resulted in Keene being
fully covered by each insurance policy, even if only part of the injury
occurred during the policy period. 9 The court specified however, that
only one policy could be applied to a specific injury. Keene had to se-
lect the policy from its succession of coverage to provide indemnifica-
tion for the injury in question.60 Since only one policy would be selected
to cover each injury, the insurance companies would benefit.61 If, for
example, three policies were in force throughout the victim's exposure
to asbestos fibers, two companies would be free from primary liability.
(Subject to the 'other insurance' provisions.)
Finally, the court determined the method of allocating liability for
each injury. The court simply concluded Keene could collect damages
from any company providing coverage during the time of injury, sub-
ject to the 'other insurance' provisions stated in the policy selected.62
The Keene theory exposes insurers to extraordinarily broad liabil-
ity for coverage, which could cause the downfall of numerous insurance
businesses.6 3 Paul W. MacAvoy, a Yale economist, predicts payments
to asbestos victims may total up to 90 billion dollars over the next
thirty years, and some insurers may have insufficient reserves to cover
these costs.64 This view was criticized by Floyd H. Knowlton, a Vice-
President of Travelers Insurance, who asserted that no carriers are
58. Id. at 1047-48.
59. Id. at 1048. The court holds that the policies do not provide for a reduction
of liability if only part of the injury occurs within the policy period. Additionally, it
states there is no authority for the suggestion that Keene is "self-insured" for periods
during which no other policy was in force. "There are no self-insurance policies, and we
respectfully submit that the contracts before us do not support judicial creation of such
additional insurance policies." Id. at 1049.
60. Id. at 1049-50.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1050. The court cites as an example INA's policy which provides:
When both this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on the
same basis, whether primary, excessive or contingent, INA shall not be
liable under this policy for a greater proportion of the loss than stated in
the applicable contribution provision below. Id.
63. Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
64. Id. at 18, col. 1.
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threatened by insolvency. 5 Other commentators compare the predic-
tions of doom to those which occurred when medical malpractice insur-
ance payments soared, yet no major crisis ever materialized. 6 Others
fear that based on the Keene decision, insurers must now "reopen their
books on policies that expired 10 or 20 years ago,"'6 7 and will be unable
to project future losses as applied to latent diseases. As a result, it may
be impossible to reliably price new policies.6 8
Asbestosis in Shipyard Workers
Statutes of Limitation:
The tolling of the statute of limitations in cases involving insidious
disease depends upon determination of the onset of bodily injury.
Under the laws of several states, the statute begins to run when the
plaintiff knows, or should have known, of the cause of injury.6 9 This
approach was followed in In re Johns-Manville, wherein asbestos vic-
tims were required to file their claims within two years of the time
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the onset of their disease. °
Other states hold this identification of injury insufficient to begin run-
ning of the statute. Under the laws of Pennsylvania, the statute will not
being to run simply because plaintiff knows of his injury-he must also
be able to determine a nexus between cause and injury.7 1 Virginia law
dictates that the statute may begin to run prior to manifestation of
symptoms if expert medical testimony can pinpoint the plaintiff's time
of injury. 2
Federal Courts of Admiralty may utilize equity as an alternative
to formal statutes of limitations. Under the doctrine of laches, proof
that a plaintiff was negligent by failing to bring a timely action is an
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 18, col. 3.
68. Id.
69. In re Johns-Manville, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Grabowski v. Turner & Newall, 516 F. Supp. 114, 118 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Under Pennsylvania law a duty is imposed upon the plaintiff to use reasonable dili-
gence in informing himself of facts concerning his injury. Id.
72. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
5811
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affirmative defense to the complaint.7 3 Laches is premised on the as-
sumption that one has abandoned his right to recover if the claim was
unreasonably delayed, thereby causing prejudice to defendant.
Federal Court Admiralty Jurisdiction:
Pursuant to Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitu-
tion, 7 5 original jurisdiction of admiralty or maritime cases is vested in
United States district courts. The definition of "maritime cases" how-
ever, has been subject to considerable controversy.
Traditionally, locality of the event determined whether a cause of
action was maritime in nature. 8 In The Plymouth,7 7 a shipowner's
claim was given maritime status when his vessel collided with a wharf
(considered land). Paradoxically the prayer for admiralty jurisdiction
by owners of storehouses on the wharf was denied. The United States
Supreme Court held, "the jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend
upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the
locality-the high seas or navigable waters where it occurred. 178 Over
one hundred years ago Justice Story held "the jurisdiction of the admi-
ralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act,"'7 9 and in
recent years the Court in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law80 upheld the
locality test. The majority in Victory Carriers, Inc. held maritime law
applicable exclusively to incidents taking place in navigable waters,
thereby denying admiralty jurisdiction in an action by a longshoreman
73. The Key City, 81 U.S. 653 (1871). The circumstances of each case must be
considered to determine whether the claim may be barred. Id. at 660.
74. Eldridge v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 54 Idaho 213, -, 30 P.2d 781, 784
(1934).
75. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States... ; to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
76. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972).
77. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 253.
80. 404 U.S. 202 (1971). The Court reasoned that although the plaintiff was
loading a ship, his injury was caused by a vehicle on land, therefore admiralty jurisdic-
tion did not apply. Id.
10




who was injured on a pier by one of his own trucks."1
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleve-
land clearly explains that using the strict locality test can lead to un-
sound conclusions.8 2 For example, admiralty jurisdiction may at times
be denied to maritime employees, whereas utilizing the strict locality
test would allow swimmers colliding in water to bring their case under
admiralty jurisdiction. "3
Courts recognize this inequity and often consider other factors
when invoking admiralty jurisdiction." The court in Executive Jet Avi-
ation defined the parameters of admiralty jurisdiction by enacting a
two part test. The criteria established that the action must not only
encompass a maritime locality but must also "bear a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity. '8 5 The combination locality
and maritime nexus test insures admiralty jurisdiction will be inappli-
cable in a situation where the cause of action fortuitously occurs in
navigable waters.
White v. Johns-Manville:
Plaintiffs in the principal case, John W. White and four compan-
ion shipyard workers, were exposed to asbestos dust over a lengthy pe-
riod of employment, and each developed asbestosis. The district court
joined a number of complaints and issued three individual findings.
First, the court held the injuries did not bear a reasonable relation to
traditional maritime activity and consequently declined to employ ad-
miralty jurisdiction.86 Pursuant to the rules of diversity jurisdiction the
court applied Virginia's two year statute of limitations for personal in-
87jury. The court commenced the limitations period from the date of
81. Id.
82. 249 U.S. at 255.
83. Id.
84. The Court in Executive Jet Aviation explains that in spite of the broad lan-
guage in cases like The Plymouth, the Court has never held that locality of an action is
the exclusive consideration in applying admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
85. Id. at 268.
86. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 1981). The
court rejected the plaintiff's claims brought under the Extension of Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1976), and general maritime law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Id.
87. Id. at 238; VA. CODE § 8.01-243 (1977).
583 1
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White's last exposure to asbestos, thereby barring his claim.88
Second, the court restricted damages to "injuries which occurred
during the period commencing at a date two years before the institu-
tion of each plaintiff's action and ending at the date of last exposure."8 9
Consistent with its ruling the court excluded evidence of asbestos expo-
sure prior to the commencement of this time period.90 Although sum-
mary judgment was granted against White and several other plaintiffs,
a jury verdict of $435,000 was awarded to four employees.91
The trial court's third order granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for the manufacturer, based upon a failure to prove injuries
during the restricted two year time period. Each order was appealed
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit court ques-
tioned the district court's refusal to apply admiralty jurisdiction. Deter-
mining that the criteria established in Executive Jet Aviation92 had
been met, the circuit court reversed. The locality requirement was ful-
filled by the employees' exposure to asbestos containing materials on
ships at both shipyard and dry-dock locations, as well as while working
at sea. The nexus requirement was also satisfied because insulation
materials are an integral part of ships, and "clearly essential to the
maritime industry." 93
The circuit court overruled the district court's application of the
Virginia statute of limitations, 94 although in applying the equitable
doctrine of laches district courts may consider state statutes of limita-
tions.95 In asbestos cases the long latency period of the disease must
also be considered, with the burden upon defendant to prove prejudice
88. White, at 238.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The cases were: "1) Oman v. Johns-Manville and Owens-Corning, 2)
Walker v. Johns-Manville, Owens-Corning and Pittsburgh Coming, 3) Reynolds v. H.
K. Porter Co. Inc. and 4) Gibbins v. Johns-Manville." Id. (emphasis deleted).
92. See supra text accompanying note 85.
93. White, at 239.
94. Id. at 239-40. The manufacturers argued that applying admiralty jurisdiction
in products liability cases would expand such jurisdiction to cases involving products
remotely associated with maritime activities. The court, however, found that the manu-
facturers were able to foresee that these insulation materials would be used primarily
on ships. Id.
95. Id. at 240.
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by showing plaintiff inexcusably delayed his claim.
The circuit court approved the district court instruction that man-
ufacturers were not liable for asbestosis incurred prior to the specified
periods of exposure. It stated, however, the defendant may be account-
able for negligent "aggravation of a pre-existing condition.""6 It was
therefore permissible for the jury to award damages based upon exac-
erbation of the plaintiff's pre-existing asbestosis. The decision of the
district court was vacated and remanded for a new trial conducted
under federal court admiralty jurisdiction.
Market--Share Liability
The third decision in the trilogy presented focuses upon the rela-
tively new doctrine of Market Share Apportionment. A basic tenet of
traditional tort liability demands plaintiff demonstrate a connection be-
tween his loss or injury, and defendant tortfeasors' act or omission.97
Historically it has been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain damages
when one is unable to clearly identify the party at fault.98 Three lim-
ited exceptions to the rule necessitating precise identification of the
tortfeasor have evolved: concert of action, alternative liability and res
ipsa loquitur.9  Under each of these doctrines, the presumption that the
defendant is in a better position to determine who actually caused the
injury shifts the burden of proof away from the plaintiff. Each defen-
dant's relationship to, and involvement in the injury producing activity
must be demonstrated.
96. Id. at 241.
97. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
98. Id. at 671-72.
99. Newcomb, Market Share Liability for Defective Products: IlI Advised Rem-
edy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300 (1981). Under each of
these doctrines there must be some evidence that the defendant could have been at
fault, whereas under "enterprise liability" or "market-share liability" no connection
between the defendant and a particular incident need be identified. It is sufficient that
the named defendant was producing the injury-causing product at the time of the oc-
currence. Id. at 310.
6:1982 585]1Asbestos Litigation
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Early Application:
In Hall v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,100 and the companion
case Chance v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,"' damages were
sought from a number of explosives manufacturers and their trade as-
sociation for injuries incurred in eighteen accidents. 102 Because identifi-
cation of the manufacturers of the blasting caps involved in each acci-
dent could not consistently be determined, defendants were randomly
selected from the six companies comprising the entire explosives indus-
try. The existing doctrines allowing recovery under these circumstances
were inapplicable since defendant's relationship to the injury-producing
activity could not be proved.103 In an effort to provide recovery to the
victims, the court in Hall suggested that virtually the entire industry be
held liable for injuries resulting from use of its product. 4 This theory,
referred to as enterprise liability or industry-wide liability, resulted
from the responsibility of industries to compensate victims for harm
typically resulting from use of its goods.1 0 5 The court proposed the en-
tire industry share the burden for any member's failure to take appro-
priate safety measures.
The doctrine received much publicity when in 1980, two suits were
brought by women who had developed cancer and/or adenosis as a re-
sult of in-utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol, ("DES"), a drug adminis-
tered to their mothers during pregnancy.10 Unable to identify which
drug company produced the particular DES ingested, plaintiff's in
Sindell employed the enterprise liability doctrine in order to hold all
manufacturers of DES jointly liable.10 7 The court modified the Hall
100. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. Id. The cases were later severed; none of the eventual decisions were based
upon the theory of enterprise liability suggested in this decision.
102. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 358.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
104. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
105. Id. at 369.
106. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super.
551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
107. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132. Plaintiffs in
Sindell alleged that all D.E.S. manufacturers adhered to identical industry-wide testing
and safety standards and should therefore be jointly liable for injuries caused by D.E.S.
1586 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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approach, deeming it unfair to impose liability on the approximately
200 distributors of DES, when only 6 or 7 manufacturers produced
90% of the drug then marketed. 08 The court formulated a narrower
application of industry wide liability:
we hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the
likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by
each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the
entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose. 0 9
Under this theory, those companies manufacturing a substantial share
of DES available at the time of distribution could be joined in the ac-
tion with the liability of each equitably apportioned."10
Market Share Apportionment Applied to Asbestos Suits:
The problem of proof encountered in Hall and Sindell repeatedly
arises in asbestos suits. Victims of asbestosis and mesothelioma are fre-
quently exposed to asbestos-containing products over an extended pe-
riod of time. It becomes impossible to determine the precise moment of
onset of the disease, therefore impossible to identify the manufacturers
of the product from which they became ill.
In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,"' a United States dis-
trict court took a step in overcoming this hurdle, by determining that
Texas courts would probably adopt some form of enterprise liability," 2
thus permitting discovery based upon the theory of market share appor-
tionment." 3 Because this ruling limited itself to discovery and cross
claim motions, a final adjudication of whether the doctrine applied to
asbestos cases has yet to be reached.
The Hardy decision, although narrow, has opened the door for
market-share liability in asbestos cases. Some commentators will cele-
Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at _.
108. Id. at ., 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at _.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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brate this extension of the Sindell doctrine. At first blush its applicabil-
ity in asbestos cases seems directly on point. Asbestos usage abounds
despite knowledge of asbestos carcinogenicity.1 14 As stated in the
landmark case introducing the concept of alternative liability, Sum-
mers v. Tice,115 when a choice exists between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendant, the latter should bear the cost for injuries in-
curred.116 If, through no fault of his own, a plaintiff cannot identify the
guilty defendant, the manufacturers primarily responsible for distribut-
ing the dangerous product to the public should apportion damages
among themselves.
Some find market-share apportionment a deplorable basis upon
which to hold asbestos manufacturers liable for damages. Contrasted
with victims of DES for whom it has been virtually impossible to iden-
tify the producers of the drug ingested by their mothers,1 1 7 plaintiffs in
asbestos cases can provide substantial information regarding the time
and place of their exposure. Although it may be impossible to consist-
ently determine which exposure caused the disease, thorough discovery
procedures may lead to identification of the appropriate defendant.
Furthermore, under the Sindell doctrine those companies not manufac-
turing DES during a particular plaintiff's exposure to the drug could
exculpate themselves from liability.11 8 Because it is often impossible to
determine the onset of disease in an asbestos case, manufacturers not
even producing the product at the time of injury should not be pre-
vented from avoiding liability. To hold a 'substantial share' of asbestos
producers liable for an injury with no evidence linking them to a partic-
ular occurrence defies the foundation upon which tort theory is based.
114. Id. at 1355.
115. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
116. Id.
117. Plaintiffs in the D.E.S. cases were not yet born when their injury occurred.
They had no means by which to determine the brand of D.E.S. administered to their
mothers. Even if medical and hospital records were available, it would be impossible to
determine with certainty the manufacturer of the D.E.S. distributed by individual
pharmacists at any given time.
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Ramifications
The trilogy of decisions presented strongly favors plaintiff's rights.
Keene expands the liability of insurance carriers who issued policies to
companies utilizing products containing asbestos. As a result, employ-
ers who are uninsured for certain time periods under either the expo-
sure theory or manifestation theory are now fully protected. The com-
panies are at last free from the possibility of facing bankruptcy because
of asbestos injuries incurred during their uninsured periods and plain-
tiffs are guaranteed a source from which to recover damages.
The White decision provides access to federal court admiralty ju-
risdiction, allowing shipyard workers to by-pass state statutes of limita-
tions which previously barred their claims. The potential surge of new
claims by shipyard employees who constitute the majority of victims
suffering from mesothelioma and asbestosis could flood our courts for
years to come.119 Finally, the Hardy application of market-share appor-
tionment in asbestos suits shifts the burden of proof away from victims.
Defendant manufacturers must demonstrate their freedom from liabil-
ity in producing the injury causing product.
The theory expanding the scope of 'when bodily injury occurs' can
be applied to a host of latent occupational diseases (e.g., those caused
by cotton dust and uranium). 12° The application of admiralty jurisdic-
tion to a products liability case where the substance was manufactured
on land, could arguably be extended to a myriad of products which
eventually find their way into a maritime environment. Although the
majority in White denies this possibility, a comparable decision was
handed down in the recent case of Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of America,121 perhaps indicating a trend in maritime products-liability
cases. Applying the theory of market-share liability to asbestos claims
indicates a growing acceptance of this relatively new doctrine, which
119. The Nat'l L.J., supra note 1.
120. Legal Times of Wash., Feb..8, 1982, at 5, col. 3.
121. 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980). The court applied admiralty jurisdiction in a
products liability case against the manufacturer of a gyro-pilot steering system used
aboard a vessel. The defendants in this case also argued that this might expand admi-
ralty jurisdiction to any case involving a product used in a maritime situation, which
the court denied. Id. For further discussion of maritime products liability, see Com-
ment, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 283 (1979).
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conceivably could be expanded to any products liability case in which
precise identification of the party at fault is impossible.
Steps have been taken which would minimize the effects of these
decisions. Numerous attorneys have been involved in lobbying efforts
for legislative action to compensate victims of asbestosis.1 12 Reactions
to this effort are mixed: some legislators see it "as too much of an effort
to bail out Johns-Manville," 123 who bears the brunt of most asbestos-
related lawsuits. Insurance companies are split while organized labor
seems to be "taking a wait and see" stance, and trial attorneys face
losing huge fees if litigation is halted.124
Under a bill proposed by Senator Hart, (D-Colo.), 25 an industry
and government funded pool would be created to compensate victims of
asbestosis. Under this act, asbestos victims would be prevented from
filing lawsuits to obtain additional remuneration. However, Rep.
George Miller (D-Calif.), who will soon introduce his own bill, states,
"let the companies explain. . . how the federal government should pay
out billions of dollars when there is established liability (on their part)
. . . .If they want a government bailout, they're whistling in a hurri-
cane." 126 Rep. Millicent H. Fenwick (R-N.J.) has proposed a bill, H.R.
5224, 127 establishing a federal trust fund which would operate through
the Labor Department, although there has been some indication that
she may abandon it and support Miller's bill.128 There has also been
some indication that Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) may intro-
duce a bill paralleling Miller's house bill, perhaps including provisions
for uranium-linked disease.1 29 Attorneys representing private industries
are also working on proposals which are intended for introduction
through sponsors in the Senate.130
122. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 1, col. 1.
123. Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139, 142 (1981).
124. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 1, col. 1.
125. Podgers, supra note 123, at 142.
126. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 5, col. 3. Sources have indi-
cated that Miller's bill would create a "federal workers' compensation mechanism,"
operating through the Labor Department, and not requiring government payments. Id.
127. H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 28, 415 (1981).
128. Legal Times of Wash., supra note 20, at 5, col. 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. These include Kenneth Feinberg, representing Raysbestos-Manhattan
Inc., William Tucker retained by Johns-Manville, and Harrison Wellford, also repre-
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Defendants are also beginning to assert that they were simply fol-
lowing government specifications in their manufacturing process.131
This "government-contract defense" has not yet been ruled on in asbes-
tos suits, but has been allowed in "Agent-Orange" cases.13 2 If success-
ful in the asbestos arena it could dispose of thousands of pending asbes-
tos suits. 133 In order to utilize this defense, defendants would have to
first prove a contractual relationship with the government.13' Since
much of the asbestos manufactured was for use in naval shipyards, it
might be possible for defendants to show this relationship. In order to
successfully assert this defense, manufacturers would have to prove
that the government established specifications for the product, the spec-
ifications were met, and the government was aware of the product's
hazards.1 35
Conclusion
Defendant manufacturers and insurance companies face a growing
threat as the arsenel of support for plaintiffs in asbestos-related cases
continually increases. A variety of compromises have been proposed,
but a multitude of problems must be overcome before a satisfactory
solution can be achieved. The necessity of reaching an equitable bal-
ance is clear. Insurance companies need protection from the threat of
over-expansive liability, employers and manufacturers must be saved
from the threat of bankruptcy, 36 and above all, the victims of asbesto-










136. After this article was committed to print, Johns-Manville Corp. filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Wall St. J., Sept. 13,
1982, at 5, col. 1.
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